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Managing Expectations: Locke on the Material Mind and Moral Mediocrity  
Catherine Wilson 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 78:127-146 (2016) 
(Post-print)  
 
In his Essay concerning Human Understanding of 1689, John Locke declared that the 
human being is Ôinconsiderable, mean, and impotent...in all probability...one of the lowest of 
all intellectual BeingsÕ (IV. iii. 23).   
 Locke hammered this point home throughout the book. We have no innate knowledge 
of theoretical or practical principles (Book I. i-iv).  Our words are largely Ôdoubtful and 
uncertain in their signification,Õ which impairs communication and the representation of 
states of affairs (III.ix.10-17).  Where the acquisition of empirical knowledge is concerned, 
we are confined to Ôa small part of the immense Universe,Õ and as to the other planets Ôwhat 
sorts of Furniture and Inhabitants those Mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as 
guess (IV. iii. 24). Here on earth, we are limited to the perception of middle-sized objects; we 
can't see the subvisible corpuscles upon which everything depends (IV.iii. 25).  Even if we 
could see them, we wouldnÕt be able to understand how configurations of primary qualities 
give rise to secondary and tertiary qualities (IV.iii. 25-6).   
 The limits theme in Locke has been well studied in connection with these issues. It is 
less a recapitulation of the theological view that our linguistic and epistemic capacities were 
destroyed in Adam's Fall, though it trades on it, than it is an attack on both scholastic 
metaphysics and the Cartesian ambition of explaining everything in corpuscularian terms and 
achieving practical mastery over nature. It is constructive as well as destructive. The key 
notion is Ômediocrity,Õ not depravity. Locke wants us to see things differently and to act 
differently, abandoning certain futile scientific pursuits along with nonreferential 
metaphysical discourse, and perhaps adopting a experimental-observational approach to 
medicine in place of the theoretical one suggested by Descartes. 
1
   
 The other context in which Locke employs the feeble, fallible man theme, his moral 
philosophy, has not been as well studied.  His chapter on ÔPowersÕ presents us as strikingly 
powerless; and in The Reasonableness of Christianity, he comments on Ôthe frailty of our 
minds, and weakness of our constitutions; how liable [we are] to mistakes, how apt to go 
astray, and how easily to be turned out of the paths of virtue.Õ  Our moral limitations, he says, 
are apparent to anyone from Ôthe testimony of his own conscience.Õ  And if some saintly 
person Ôfeels not his own errours and passions always tempting, and often prevailing, against 
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the strict rules of his duty; he need but look abroad into any stage of the world, to be 
convinced...Õ (R 112).  
 
 Had Locke been a more conventional philosopher, human mediocrity would not have 
presented him with the problem of reconciling anthropology with moral demandingness; he 
could have subscribed to the traditional scheme of fallen-man-but-with-God-given-free-will 
that had long served to reconcile inherent sinfulness with moral obligation.  But Locke did 
not really believe in free will.  On the contrary, he thought that human beings are essentially 
passional, hedonistic organised bodies. Our constitutions, in all their reactivity and 
impulsiveness, are given to us by God for our own benefit, but God at the same time requires 
from us behaviour in conformity with Christian moral principles.   
 Doubting the existence of an incorporeal soul and regarding the person as a material 
machine endowed with a bundle of powers, Locke decided to try, as he explained in his 
Epistle to the Reader of the Essay, the difficult task: Ôto put Morality and Mechanism 
togetherÕ (I. iii. 14).   He had to show why libertinism was not the inevitable consequence of 
accepting mortalism and materialism.  He had three distinct solutions to this problem, which 
also required him to present a new theory of the Resurrection as personality-restoration via 
memory-restoration.   The first solution involved undercutting his own passional account by 
assigning the mind a power of suspension.  A second, more satisfactory and interesting 
solution was to treat moral competence on analogy with physical skill, as a capability 
achieved through instruction and practice.  The third solution was to face the mediocrity 
problem head on and to insist on divine forgiveness.   
 In the final analysis, Locke didnÕt paint a very convincing picture of moral 
responsibility. For, despite Ðindeed, because of--his suspicion that we are hedonistic 
machines, he needed the Christian revelation with its carrot-and-stick approach to defining 
and cultivating rectitude.
2
  This commitment sat oddly, to the contemporary mind, with his 
metaphysically cautious and sociologically observant outlook. Nevertheless LockeÕs project 
of relating morality to nature and education as far as possible is impressive, and the more 
radical elements of his moral psychology, though they were evident to 18th century 
empiricists, have perhaps not been appreciated fully.  Locke describes multiple instances of 
passional behaviour, striving for a descriptively adequate, realistic account of human 
cravings, ambivalence, and weakness.  He was a mechanical philosopher who denied the will 
an autonomous role and who refused to assert that the faculty of reason is sovereign over 
feeling. 
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To explore the limits theme in LockeÕs moral philosophy and to argue for this 
interpretation of the morality-and-mechanism passage, I will first defend the claim that 
humans, in LockeÕs view are soulless corporeal machines (or at least that moral theory must 
assume that they are).  Next, I draw attention to some of LockeÕs many passages on 
emotionality and impulsivity; and finally I comment on the forgiveness theme in his moral 
theology, a conceptual device that to some extent mediates between his naturalism and his 
moralism.   
 
 
I. LockeÕs theory of the material soul 
 
 One of the many background assumptions Locke was challenging in the Essay was 
that an incorporeal, intrinsically immortal soul endowed with a free will was a necessary 
condition of morally significant agency. He did not think our practices should rely on an 
experience-transcendent proposition, and, on his considered view, ÔAll the great Ends of 
Morality and Religion, are well enough secured, without philosophical Proofs of the Soul's 
ImmaterialityÕ (IV. iii. 6). 
 There is room for debate on the question what Locke had in mind with his 
counterproposal that God might have superadded powers of thought to matter Ôsuitably 
organised.Õ There is further room for debate over whether he believed that that is what 
happened, and that we are wholly material and mortal beings, or held, more cautiously and 
circumspectly, that the existence of the separable Cartesian soul was an unproved though 
possible, indeed probable hypothesis. 
3
  Although his language sometimes indicates the 
latterÑLocke declares that it not his intention anywhere to Ôin any way lessen the belief of 
the Soul's ImmaterialityÕ (IV.iii.6 )--and although there was apparently nothing to be gained 
by way of public esteem and much to be lost in advancing the former thesis, consideration of 
the Essay as a whole suggests that Locke, in company with many physicians of the 17th 
century, suspected the former to be true.  
 The attack on the Cartesian soul and the corresponding defense of thinking matter is 
developed by employing the mediocrity argument. According to Locke,  ÔThe simple ideas 
we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which 
the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any 
discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideasÕ (II. xxiii. 29). 
We have an idea of the soul derived through experience as an immaterial thing that thinks and 
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that can Ôexcite motion in the body by willing or thoughtÕ  (but not bodies at a distance from 
it) (II.xxiii. 20-22), and an idea of body derived through experience as involving Ôthe 
cohesion of solid, and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating motion 
by impulseÕ(II. xxii.17).  Both ideas are ÔobscureÕ. The idea of matter is obscure because 
cohesion is inexplicable, and so is the communication of motion. The idea of the soul is 
obscure because we can have no experience of things that do not impact on our senses. So, as 
far as proper epistemology, that is ÔContemplation of our own Ideas, without revelation,Õ is 
concerned, we cannot discover either that ÔOmnipotency has given to Matter fitly disposed, a 
power to perceive and thinkÕ or that God has Ôjoined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a 
thinking immaterial SubstanceÕ (IV. iii.6). 
4
    
 In his lengthy correspondence with Stillingfleet over what was obviously a 
provocative remark, Locke refused to back down. He developed an argument that is not 
found in the Essay, though it is consistent with his view that nature is characterised by 
continuity and with his appeal to gravity as a superaddition.Õ
5
  First, he argued that even in 
purely material systems such as the solar system, the Ôbare essenceÕ or Ônatural powersÕ of 
matter are unable to account for planetary orbits. Next, he pointed out that Ôthe vegetable part 
of the creation is not doubted to be wholly material; and yet he that will look into it, will 
observe excellencies and operations in this part of matter, which he will not find contained in 
the essence of matter in general, nor be able to conceive how they can be produced by it.Õ   
Advancing to the animal world, we Ômeet with yet greater perfections and properties, no ways 
explicable by the essence of matter in general.Õ This indicates that the Creator superadded the 
ÔqualitiesÕ of life, sense, and spontaneous motion, along with a power of propagation, and so, 
the implication is, the addition of the property of thought is only the next step in Ôthe 
superinducement of greater perfections and nobler qualitiesÕ.
6
 
 As well as professing ignorance as to the nature of substance, and as to GodÕs 
employment of His powers, and advancing the stepwise argument just cited, Locke engages 
in constant sniping at the incorporeal Cartesian soul that is the repository of imprinted innate 
ideas and whose essence it is to think. Their claim that the essence of the soul is to think 
forced the Cartesians to embrace the conclusion that the soul always thinks (on pain of the 
selfÕs not existing), in the womb, when asleep, when detached from the body (II. i. 9-19) even 
if we are not always aware of ourselves as thinking those thoughts   But thinking, says Locke, 
is an operation of the mind, something we suppose ÔitÕ can do, not an essential attribute 
(ibid.) Why would God have created an incorporeal soul that produces thoughts of which the 
subject is unaware, or that it immediately forgets, along with the follies of dreams? A 
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thinking mind of whose thoughts we are unaware Ômakes two persons of one manÕ (ibid. 19).  
Further,  
 
They who make the soul a thinking thing, at this rate, will not make it a much more 
noble being, than those do, whom they condemn, for allowing it to be nothing but the 
subtilest parts of matter. Characters drawn on dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; 
or impressions made on a heap of atoms, or animal spirits, are altogether as useful, and 
render the subject as noble, as the thoughts of a soul that perish in thinking; that once out 
of sight are gone for ever, and leave no memory of themselves behind them (II. i. 15). 
 
Matter, he concludes, is not such useless stuff (ibid.)  
         There are however some passages in which Locke seems to acknowledge the existence, 
or at least the probable existence of incorporeal spirits. For example, in Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education, Locke argued that materialism is a tempting position but one 
inadequate to explain all the phenomena, and that young gentlemen ought to be discouraged 
from adopting it. ÔMatter being a thing, that all our Senses are constantly conversant with, it 
is so apt to possess the Mind, and exclude all other Beings, but Matter, that prejudice, 
grounded on such Principles, often leaves no room for the admittance of Spirits, or the 
allowing any such things as immaterial Beings in rerum natura.Õ
7
 
         LockeÕs concern here is, however with atheism, not with the existence of other spiritual 
substances.  Locke did believe in an incorporeal God, the necessary author of the many active 
powers he ascribed to material nature, and he believed himself to have given a good and 
novel argument for the existence of the Ôeternal cogitative Being,Õ  namely that ÔIt is 
impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative Matter should produce a thinking, 
intelligent Being, as that nothing should of it self produce MatterÕ(IV. x. 10).  His references 
to other spirits, even in the context of his ÔmediocrityÕ sentiments, appear exaggerated and 
ironic. ÔHow inconsiderable a rank the Spirits that inhabit our Bodies hold amongst those 
various and possibly innumerable, kinds of nobler Beings; and how far short they come of the 
Endowments and Perfections of Cherubims and Seraphims, and infinite sorts of Spirits above 
us, is what by a transient hint, in another place, I have offered to my Reader's Consideration.Ô 
(IV. x. 17). As he has already pointed out several times, Ôhaving the Ideas of Spirits does not 
make us know, that any such Things do exist without us, or that there are any finite Spirits, or 
any other spiritual Beings but the Eternal GODÕ (IV: xi. 12). 
8
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 Several other passages seem initially to pose apparent problems for ascribing 
materialism-with-powers to Locke.  First, at (II. xxiii.16) he says that the soul is a Ôreal beingÕ 
and that ÔI ...know, that there is some spiritual being within me, that sees and hears. This, I 
must be convinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could be, without 
an immaterial thinking being.Õ  Second, at II. xxvii. 25, he says, ÔI agree, the more probable 
opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of one individual 
immaterial substance.Õ   And third, in his discussion of personal identity, at II. Xxvii. 15-23, 
he appears to take seriously the idea that souls can be detached from bodies in which they are 
or were ordinarily resident and attached to other bodies.    
 To the first point, all Locke appears to mean here is that neither matter nor thought 
could have come into the world in the absence of an original thinking being with creative 
powers. The Ôreal beingÕ of the soul does not imply the reality of individual incorporeal 
cogitative substance, by contrast with the real existence of soul-functions. All we know is that 
Ôwe have in us something that thinksÕ (IV. Ii. 6)-- a Ôspiritual beingÕÑnot what its 
metaphysical nature is, and we can safely take the reference to the Ôimmaterial thinking 
beingÕ that is a condition of anythingÕs seeing and hearing to be the Creator.  To the second 
point, when Locke refers to the existence of the incorporeal soul as the more ÔprobableÕ 
opinion, I take it he is using ÔprobableÕ in the casuistic sense; it is the opinion accepted by 
most authorities.  He cannot be using ÔprobableÕ in an evidentiary sense, insofar as he 
maintains that we have no positive evidence whatsoever for the existence of individual 
incorporeal cogitative substance.  Finally, as for the supposition of Ôdetachable souls,Õ the aim 
of all the examples involving pigs and Socrates, cobblers and princes, is not to make it appear 
probable that souls can flit about, alighting in other bodies, but to show that what we consider 
relevant to identity is entirely experiential: the existence of first-person memories.  
 Perhaps, someone might insist, Locke genuinely has no preference for or against the 
hypothesis of the incorporeal soul?  Perhaps thinking matter is merely a worst case scenario 
to be armed against?  Given the evidence, text external as well as text internal, this is 
implausible. The criticism of Locke as a ÔHobbistÕ by John Edwards, the careful distinction 
Edwards made between Locke and Boyle, who was very much like Locke in his presentation 
of the corpuscularian hypothesis and his doctrine of qualities, but above theological 
suspicion, together with LockeÕs reception in the 18th century as the principal proponent of 
thinking matter as shown years ago by John Yolton
9
  all confirm the seriousness of LockeÕs 
attraction to the hypothesis.  If you truly regard theologically scandalous hypothesis A as no 
more likely than theologically safe hypothesis B, why strive to impress on your readers that 
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the arguments and evidence for B are utterly lacking without correspondingly casting 
aspersions on A?   Further, LockeÕs agenda for moral philosophy is premised on our being 
hedonistic, but not entirely unreasonable machines, as I now show.  
 
 
II. LockeÕs Depiction of Passional Man  
 We are, then, corporeal machines with superadded qualities and powers, including 
life, movement, reproduction, experience and thinking, and we find ourselves in the world 
endowed with a set of reactions and mental habits that preserve our lives. Pain and pleasure, 
punishment and reward, are the basic elements of the human experiential economy. 
10
  ÔGod 
has so framed the constitutions of our minds and bodies,Õ says Locke in his early essay on the 
passions
11
 Ôthat several things are apt to produce in both of them pleasure and pain, delight 
and trouble, by ways that we know not, but for ends suitable to His goodness and wisdom.  
Thus the smell of roses and the tasting of wine, light and liberty, the possession of power and 
the acquisition of knowledge please most men, and there are some things whose very being 
and existence delights others, as children and grandchildren.Õ 
12
    
 The references to pleasure--to sensory pleasure and the pleasures of human 
relationshipsÑestablishes Locke as something of a voluptuary, refusing both Christian 
aceticism and Stoic ideals of independence and tranquillity.  Here he follows Descartes, who 
insisted that perceptions, feelings, and emotions are all essentially good, and Hobbes who 
considered tranquillity a false and absurd ideal.  Like the ÔideasÕ of the external world 
generated by the senses, and the ÔideasÕ of hunger and thirst generated by the bodily organs, 
feelings and emotions are ÔideasÕ produced by situations.   According to DescartesÕs 
influential account, pleasure and pain and their prospects prompt actions, according to the 
designs of God, for the welfare of the living creature.  Although the senses and our internal 
sensations can deceive us, they mostly do not, and we do well for the most part to trust them.
 
13
 The same holds for the emotions. For Hobbes, tranquillity belongs neither to death nor to 
life, for it is a denial of the Ôvital motionsÕ by which we live. 
14
  For both of LocvkeÕs 
predecessors, the passions sometimes need repression, not because tranquillity is a desirable 
state of the soul but rather because they can be dangerous or harmful to other people.  For 
Locke, as for Hobbes and Spinoza, emotion-driven religious and political enthusiasms and 
the persecution manias of groups become the focus of concern.
15
  
 Locke agrees with Descartes: Ôour All-Wise Maker, suitable to our constitution and 
frame, and knowing what it is that determines the Will, has put into man the uneasiness of 
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hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, to move and determine their Wills, for the 
preservation of themselves and the continuation of their SpeciesÕ ( II.xxi.34), thereby adding 
sexual desire to the list of beneficial human endowments.  In his chapter on ÔPowers,Õ in the 
Essay he evokes vividly the misery of needing and wanting things, and the individuality and 
specificity of our desires.   
 
The ordinary necessities of our lives, fill a great part of them with the uneasiness of 
Hunger, Thirst, Heat. Cold, Weariness, with labour, and Sleepiness in their constant 
returnsÉ To whichÉ if we add the fantastical uneasiness , (as itch after Honour, Power, 
or Riches, etc.) which acquired habits, by Fashion, Example, and Education have settled 
in us, and a thousand other irregular desiresÉwe find, that a very little part of our life is 
Évacant from these uneasinessesÉ (II. xxi.45).  
 
Some wants and preferences of particular human beingsÑsuch as food, drink, shelter, and 
liberty-- are universal; others, such as ambition and lust, take forms that vary from culture to 
culture.   
 Locke appeals to the innocent pleasures and satisfactions of consuming Cheese, 
Lobsters, Apples, Plumbs, and Nuts. He also comments on the painful deprivations that 
render people pathetic and desperate. There is the drunkard, whose Ôhabitual ThirstÕ drives 
him to the tavern despite his ability to see that Ôhis Health decays, his Estate wastes; Discredit 
and Diseases,Õ pursue him (II. xxi. 35); the bridegroom driven to conjugal life by Ôburning 
(ibid. 34);Õ and Rachel in the Bible, who cries out Ògive me Children, give me the thing 
desirÕd or I die.Õ  For Locke, ÔLife it self and all its Enjoyments, is a burden cannot be born 
under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasinessÕ (ibid. 32). 
 In his ÔPowersÕ chapter, Locke analyses liberty as a relationship between a personÕs 
preferences and their environmental constraints.  A person has liberty not when his or her will 
is free, as the notion of a free will is meaningless in his eyes, but when there are no 
constraints imposed by their situation or the laws of external nature on what they prefer to do, 
or (Locke is not always clear on this point) no constraints on what a person could do if they 
preferred to do that thing (II. xxi. 8-12).  A person also lacks liberty when there are internal 
constraints that prevent them from doing what it is in their long term interest to do, that is 
what they would (continuously) prefer to do, absent the blocking feature. Lacking liberty is in 
fact a fairly common occurrence. In the morning, the drunkard prefers not to waste his estates 
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and he is is free to resist a drink, but as evening comes, the drinking motivation swamps that 
preference and he cannot do otherwise than go down to the soaking club. 
 Locke refers in this connection to those Ôextreme disturbancesÕ that can Ôpossesses our 
whole mind.  ÔSome ideas,Õ he says, 
 
like some motions to the body, are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor 
obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay 
by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations: And sometimes a 
boisterous passion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us 
the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chooseÕ (II:xxi:12).  
 
...[A] ny vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable passion of a man violently in love, or 
the impatient desire of revenge, keeps the will steady and intent; and the will, thus 
determined, never lets the understanding lay by the object, but all the thoughts of the mind 
and powers of the body are uninterruptedly employed that way, by the determination of the 
will, influenced by that topping uneasiness as long as it lasts  (II:xxi:38).  
 
For a woman who has lost a beloved child, its death Ôrends from her Heart, the whole comfort 
of her Life, and gives her all the torment imaginable; use the Consolations of Reason in this 
case, and you were as good preach Ease to one on the Rack, and hope to allay by Rational 
Discourses, the Pain of his Joints tearing asunderÕ (II:xxxiii.13).  The idea of the child and 
her lost enjoyment are so tightly associated that if time does not erode her memories she may 
Ôcarry an incurable SorrowÕ to the grave.   
 Thus reason has no definite power over the emotions. The powers of self-control we 
associate with the will come and go; when, experientially, we regain control of ourselves in a 
moment of fury, or are able to resist some temptation, we feel and describe ourselves as 
Ôfree.Õ But freedom is not a metaphysical attribute that we possess in virtue of having a soul.  
Contrary to what Descartes said, it is not in the least comparable with GodÕs will.  ÔWillingÕ 
implies desiring and preferring, and emotion-driven behaviour is not what takes over when 
reason loses its grip but the only real option.   Consequently, moral motivation can only take 
the form of appetite; it is on all fours with hunger and thirst ÔÕLet a man be never so well 
perswaded of the advantages of virtueÉyet till he hungers and thirsts after righteousness, till 
he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be determinÕd to any action in pursuit 
of this confessed greater goodÕ (II. xxi. 35).  
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 Having analysed human freedom in terms of preferences and obstacles, and voiced 
the view that human beings are neither free nor determined but sometimes able to direct their 
thoughts and actions, at other times utterly undone and overwhelmed by them, Locke, in the 
first edition of the Essay, declared that ÔGood, therefore, the greater good, is that alone which 
determines the will.Õ It is widely believed that he changed his mind in response to criticism, 
but close analysis shows that he changed only his wording, which was misleading, but not his 
underlying view.
16
  His original argument in First Edition of the Essay, II. xxi.28-45, ran as 
follows 
Pleasure and pain, whether of mind and body, are produced by the operation of bodies on 
us. 
Happiness is pleasure, Misery is pain. 
Whatever produces or contributes to Happiness is what we call Good. 
Whatever produces or is conducive to Misery we call Evil. 
The will is determined by what best pleases it. 
ÔGood, therefore, the greater good, is that alone which determines the will.Õ 
 
If we were able to look on happiness (pleasure) and our misery (pain) with indifference, he 
comments, we would not be free but miserable and enslaved.  Someone who does not 
respond to hedonic incentives and ahedonic disincentives, in other words, must be in the grip 
of some pathology.  But if the Good is, ultimately, pleasure, isnÕt this to say that our liberty is 
not diminished in having no freedom to be indifferent to pleasure? How is this view tenable?. 
 LockeÕs original answer to this question was that ÔgoodÕ and ÔevilÕ do just reflect 
preferences; every evil is somebodyÕs good and vice versa. Some people are attracted by 
study and knowledge, some by hawking and hunting; some go in for by luxury and 
debauchery, others for sobriety and riches. Some people prefer wine to the preservation of 
their eyesight.  In the second edition of the Essay, where the chapter on Powers was greatly 
expanded, Locke apologised to his readers for his apparent error in agreeing with the received 
view that the will always pursues, is always determined by, the greater Good (II.xxi.35).  He 
had obviously realised that his subjectivism was unacceptable. So he introduced a notion of 
the Ôtrue (greater) goodÕ as opposed to the apparent.  Locke continued to hold that everyone 
simply pursues what looks best to him or her, and if there were no ÔProspect beyond the 
Grave and if Ôall Concerns of Man terminated in this Life,Õ the diversity of preferences would 
be beyond criticism (II. Xxi.54).   However, what produces the most pleasure and least pain 
over the very long term is compliance with GodÕs commands as far as possible.  The Ôtrue 
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goodÕ is accordingly Ôwhat produces the most pleasure and least painÕ for the individual over 
the long term.  Nobody pursues the true good, however, unless they actually develop a hunger 
for it.   
 The emendation to his theory of motivation was accordingly essentially verbal. Locke 
no longer speaks of the greater good as attracting and so determining the will as a Platonist 
who believed that the soul of man years for the Good, the True and the Beautiful might.  
Rather he emphasises the push from ÔuneasinessÕ Ðthe desire to escape from conditions of 
want and deprivation.  The ÔuneasinessÕ account does not however replace the Ôgreater goodÕ 
account.  It was already there in the first edition, where he had observed that, there are in us 
Ôa great many uneasinesses always solliciting and ready to determine the willÉÕ When 
possessed by the pain of deprivation, we cannot attend to any pleasure in prospect Ôa little of 
it extinguishes all our PleasuresÉ[w]e desire to be rid of the present Evil, which we are apt 
to think nothing absent can equalÕ (II. Xxi. 41) . Motivation remains personal and subjective. 
The true good remains what it was-- happiness or pleasureÑeither the greater happiness and 
pleasure that result in terrestrial life by moderating desires, or the happiness and pleasure that 
attend obedience to divine commands in the next world. 
17
 
 As observed earlier, LockeÕs chapter on Powers turns out to be largely about 
powerlessness.  We canÕt understand power metaphysically, but there is empirical reality to 
being in a locked room, or longing for a child we canÕt conceive, or being overcome by rage 
or by some addiction. Locke presents the reader with a distinctly mediocre moral agent. 
Because the mind is not metaphysically distinct from the body, or the will from desire, it 
would seem that there are no a priori generalisations to be made about what lies within ÔourÕ 
power. For different individuals, in different cases, what lies within their power is different. 
 The moralist in Locke could not accept his anthropological conclusions.  Shifting into 
the admonitory and moralistic mode, he declares that we are not entitled to appeal to our own 
frailty, as our excuse. ÔNor let any one say he cannot govern his passions, nor hinder them 
from breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a prince, or a great 
man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.Õ (II. xxi. 53).  The same lecture is 
delivered at II. xxi.71, where Locke startlingly asserts that Ôthe satisfaction of any particular 
desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action, till we have 
maturely  examinÕd, whether the particular apparent goodÉmakes a part of our real 
Happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent with it.Õ   
 The suggestion that any passion or impulse whatsoever can be repressed on the spot is 
frankly inconsistent with everything else Locke has been arguing in his chapter, as several 
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commentators have noted.  He would have done better to remind his readers that they are 
thinking matter as well as emotional matter and that their passions are not entirely 
ungovernable, and are in fact more governable than they may suppose. 
 
III.  Mediocrity and Education  
 
 LockeÕs view of the person as an arena of competing powers, emotional and rational, 
situated in the midst of a complex, poorly-understood, unpredictable  universe, and as highly 
vulnerable to psychological and moral upset recommended to him a solution that seems not to 
have occurred to Descartes, Spinoza or Hobbes, namely the education of the young.  Where 
Descartes and Spinoza remain focussed on self-improvement, and Hobbes on social 
organisation, Locke, in keeping with his lifelong interest in children and childhood, sees early 
intervention into the structure of human mental machinery as critical.  In this connection as 
well, he thinks materialistically and rejects the posit of an essentially rational soul.  In his 
essay On the Conduct of the Understanding, he develops numerous parallel between physical 
and mental education.  He argues that as the bodily deportment of a gentleman, the legs of a 
dancing master, and the fingers of a musician, which are no different in their original 
construction from those of the ploughman, can only be developed through long practice, so 
mental qualities including wit, poetic talent, and reasoning are advanced by practice and 
encouragement.
18
  Skill in mathematics is like skill in writing, painting, dancing or fencing. 
19
 
We are not born reasonable but only potentially so, and we become reasonable through ÔUse 
and ExerciseÕ of our mental faculties.  Further, education should not overstress the educatee: 
ÔThe mind by being engagÕd in a Talk beyond its Strength, like the Body, strainÕd by lifting at 
a Weight too heavy often has its force broken.Õ 
20
  Finally, the Ôvariety of Distempers in Mens 
Minds  is as great as those in their Bodies;...Õ
21
. 
 The constant references to legs and limbs in the Conduct speak only to the 
parallelism, not to the identity of mind and body.  They do however invite the reader to 
regard human rationality in a robustly physical light.  Moral education meanwhile serves to 
replace destructive or useless forms of uneasiness with more constructive ones.  It aims at 
creating an appetite for the long term good and to make the pupil or oneself Ôuneasy in the 
want of it, or in the fear of losing itÉÕ (II. Xxi. 53).  Religious instruction, Locke thought, 
including instruction in the Christian duties and their rewards and penalties serves as input to 
the human machine that can modify the character of young persons.  Even the Stoic 
philosophy found in Cicero can have this beneficial effect. 
22
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  At times, these remodelling efforts seem to be carried too far in LockeÕs imagination.   
He thought not only that children could be conditioned out of their baseless fears, such as fear 
of frogs, by a kind of cognitive behavioural therapy, but that they needed to be hardened 
against pain and discomfort by being made to experience them. Ô Since the great Foundation 
of Fear in Children is Pain,Õ he observes in Some Thoughts on Education,  the way to harden, 
and fortifie Children against Fear and Danger, is to accustom them to suffer Pain. This 'tis 
possible will be thought, Ô he admits, Ôby kind Parents, a very unnatural thing towards their 
ChildrenÉ.Õ 
23
  Although his good friend Molyneux offered no comment on this passage, 
Molyneux professed himself ÔshockÕdÕ by LockeÕs view -- Ôall that in your whole book  I 
stick atÕ-- that the educator ought never to give into childrenÕs desires.
 24
  In his treatise,  
Locke had stated  Ôa child should never be sufferÕd to have what he craves, or so much as 
speaks for, much less if he cries for it.Õ 
25
 Only in this way can children be taught to Ôstifle 
their desires and to practice modesty and temperance.Õ   Molyneux seems to agree that one 
should ignore childrenÕs complaints of hunger, but he thinks Locke goes overboard in 
applying his stifling to Ôwants of fancy and affectation.Õ  Why may they not choose for 
themselves Ôharmless things, and plays or sports?Õ In response, Locke says that he is not 
against childrenÕs recreation. They are however apt to covet trips, Ôfine cloaths, and 
playthings.Õ Desires of this sort Ôbeing indulged when they are little, grows up with age, and 
with that enlarges it self to things of greater consequence. And has ruinÕd more families than 
one on the world. This should be supressed in its very first rise.Õ 
26
 
  This evident harshness and insistence on training in ÔstiflingÕ seems to contrast with 
the more sympathetic attitudes towards tears and neediness that Locke evinces in the Essay. 
This is consistent with his view that children are highly plastic, whereas adults are 
comparatively rigid. Once the critical age is past, the machine, with all its skills and 
associative habits is fully formed, and change is difficult.  Recognising the power of desires 
in adult life, Locke clearly thinks it best to begin early in learning self-control.  His apparent 
severity on the subject of childrenÕs desires and vulnerabilities is consistent with his overall 
picture: human appetitiveness shows up already in childhood.  The conflict between the 
demands of morality and the God-given constitution of human emotional and appetitive 
machinery is accordingly mitigated by the susceptibility of the machinery to teaching. 
 
IV.  Mediocrity and Forgiveness  
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 The comparative rigidity of the adult mind leaves a residual problem of moral 
accountability.  What about persons who have not received a Christian education, such as the 
infanticidal and cannibalistic Caribbeans described with evident horror in Book I, or those 
whose fully-formed emotional dispositions or cravings leave them vulnerable to rages and 
regrettable actions?  Human emotionality and its sequelae can obtain divine forgiveness in 
LockeÕs theology.  As our frame and constitution, and so the mechanisms that determine the 
human will, are established by the Creator, it would be morally and rationally unacceptable to 
be punished for every disobedient action or omission to which we are impelled.  In his 
treatment of such persons, Locke reflects the softer theological mood of his contemporaries, 
the liberal Puritans and Anglicans, including Richard Baxter, Gilbert Burnet, and Isaac 
Barrow  who see divine knowledge and power as manifest in the understanding and mercy of 
God rather than in GodÕs piercing vision when it comes to the detection of hidden sins and 
the force and scope of his wrath.  
27
  
 In The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke makes this point clearly.  The person 
whose rational self-control has forsaken them under intolerable pressure will receive divine 
mercy.   
 
But if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole mind, as when 
the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, anger, or any other violent passion, 
running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not masters enough of 
our own minds to consider thoroughly and examine fairly; God, who knows our frailty, pities 
our weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and sees what was and what 
was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful father (II. Xxi. 53).  
 
One cannot morally require, from a given human being, what their machine, by reason of its 
constitution and its experiences, cannot produce by way of prudent or correct behaviour.  
There is no point in trying to reason with a woman who has lost a beloved child or with the 
drunkard or the person in a jealous rage. In such cases, while the law or society must punish 
the crimes that result, God, who sees into the heart, may forgive 
 God, Locke says, Ôdid not expect... a perfect obedience, void of slips and falls: he 
knew our make, and the weakness of our constitution too well, and was sent with a supply for 
that defectÕ (R 112).  The Redeemer was sent to give mankind a second chance at eternal life 
after the first was botched, and God gives second chances to some persons who have blotted 
their copy-books. ÔGod will require of every man, Òaccording to what a man hath, and not 
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according to what he hath not.Ó He will not expect the improvement of ten talents, where he 
gave but one; nor require any one should believe a promise of which he has never heardÕ (R 
132).  The pagans and savages are not condemned to hell, despite their highly uncharitable 
behaviour.  
 Locke points out that his account of personal identity is Ôforensic;Õ i.e., is meant to 
provide a relevant and useful criterion of responsibility in creatures subject to the  law. (III. 
xxvii. 26).  However, it emerges that the human law is not entirely capable of recognising 
persons.  Agency depends on what we ought to remember, not simply on what we do 
remember, and that is a transcendental notion.  Only God can ascertain what we ought to 
remember, given who we are and what the context of some actions of our bodyÕs was, and 
only God, it seems, can ascertain whether we could have exerted ourselves to avoid doing 
wrong on some occasion.  ÔHumane JudicaturesÕ must punish the disorderly drunkard 
because the man, that is to say his body, committed a crime, but God may excuse him insofar 
as Ôno one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing ofÕ (II. xxvii.22).  
 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
 The mediocrity of human beings is something of a clich in Western philosophy. The 
notion  that human beings are intermediate between angel and beast, sharing in the 
intellectual powers of angels but also the bodily functions and passions of beasts, can be 
traced back to Augustine and Neoplatonism.  Locke made something new of the mediocrity 
figure.  First, he instituted a sharp, double-pronged attack on both the certainty of Cartesian 
metaphysics and the realisability of the Cartesian ambition to explain all phenomena 
mechanically and to become Ômasters and possessors of nature.Õ  Second, he used the 
mediocrity figure to show the way to improving practical philosophy by understanding 
human psychology in a realistic, rather than in an idealistic or artificially exaggerated 
fashion.  For Locke, human moral mediocrity is not the manifestation of an inherent 
metaphysical sinfulness permeating the human soul that can be expelled, momentarily or 
permanently by an act of divine grace.  Rather it is an inevitability arising from the God-
given powers of the human constitution and their liability to becoming unbalanced.  .  
 How well did Locke succeed in his project of making Morality consistent with 
Mechanism?  By mechanism, Locke did not mean either atheism or, for that matter, deism. 
Judging by his professed horror at the brutality of warfare and the practices of savages 
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involving women and children, LockeÕs moral ideals relate to the protection of the weak, a 
value he finds exclusively in Christian religious teaching.  The implicit distinction between 
the morally desirable and the merely desired requires a transcendental source in GodÕs 
commands, although the motive to obey them can only be a strictly prudential desire for 
eternal happiness over eternal misery.  In the absence of GodÕs ability to reward and punish 
obedience and disobedience, and his commitment to doing so, all human motivation would be 
properly governed by a combination of appetite and mundane prudence.   
 Locke thought his argument for an incorporeal Creator of matter and the many and 
varied powers of life and thought conclusive and irrefutable.  He considered and rejected the 
position of Spinozists who conceded the necessary existence of an eternal cogitative being 
but considered it to be material, as well as that of the Epicurean atheists who thought that 
particles of matter can produce cogitation on their own (IV. x. 5-15).  He did not, however, 
have an argument to show that the eternal cogitative being has an ongoing interest in the 
affairs of human individuals.  Nothing in our experience or demonstrable a priori indicates 
that this is the case. And his discussion of Revelation and miracles in Book IV, Chs 16 and 
18, needed to establish the unique warrant of Christian morality and its linkage with 
punishment and reward is basically unconvincing. 
 The upshot is that there are fractures in LockeÕs moral philosophy that other 
philosophers, even those who shared his mechanistic view of the passions avoided.  Descartes 
put God out of the business of enforcing morality, avoiding having to address the question 
why God creates emotional, fallible beings and sends many of them to hell, and Spinoza 
explicitly dispensed with salvation and retribution in the usual senses. Instead of faulting 
Locke for having to introduce supernatural elements to explain normativity and to encourage 
obedience, his achievement can be recognised. Whilst remaining to some extent (though not 
enough to satisfy his critics) within a Christian framework, Locke made the passions and the 
gratification of desire prominent in his image of human life, propounded radical ideas about 
the power of education, insisted on divine understanding and mercy as constituents of divine 
justice, and adopted a highly tolerant, individualistic stance with respect to the pleasures and 
worldly goods.   
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